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COMMENTARY 
"CHILLING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE"­
THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 
STANLEY MOSK* 
III blows the wind that profits nobody. ** 
The recent winds have indeed profited the Supreme Court of 
California. The Ayatollah Khomeini, the Russian invasion of Af­
ghanistan, and Woodward and Armstrong! have driven us off the 
front pages. The court, however, shall return to national attention 
in the near future. 2 
The Supreme Court of California was catapulted into the na­
tion's headlines after allegations surfaced that justices may have 
manipulated the electoral system for their own political gain. Dur­
ing the 1978 campaign, and particularly on election eve, unfavor­
able newspaper articles appeared alleging that politically sensitive 
cases3 were held up, not to be filed until after the election at 
* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. This article is adapted from a lec­
ture given during the Administrative Law Judges' Symposium, February 15, 1980, in 
Washington, D.C. 
** SHAKESPEARE, Henry VI, Part 3, IIv. 
1. R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT (1979). 
2. See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra. 
3. Particularly significant is the opinion in People v. Tanner, 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 
P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (en bane), in which a majority of the supreme 
court affirmed a trial judge's decision to grant probation, notwithstanding a statute 
mandating that probation not be granted to persons using firearms during specified 
crimes. Chief Justice Bird concurred on the ground that the statute was un­
1 
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which Chief Justice Rose Bird was a candidate for retention. 4 In 
response, the Chief Justice unilaterally took the unprecedented 
step of requesting "an impartial and complete investigation by the 
Commission on Judicial Performance."5 
The Commission, never before cast into the limelight, re­
sponded with enthusiasm and, through appropriate channels, had 
its rules changed to provide for public investigative hearings. 6 
Thus, television and radio coverage were welcomed. Such open 
proceedings, prior to actual disciplinary recommendations to the 
supreme court itself, were clearly contrary to state constitutional 
requirements of confidentiality.7 Reason and restraint, however, 
were swept aside by fear and emotion. 
The Commission, in conducting the investigation, discarded 
traditional safeguards in favor of unrestrained attempts to gather 
relevant and even irrelevant information. For example, the Com­
mission declared itself not bound by rules of evidence. 8 Thus, it 
permitted reports on corridor gossip among law clerks, inquiries 
constitutional. Public dissatisfaction with the decision, indicated by several strong dis­
sents, was ended after the decision was vacated in People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 
596 P.2d 32B, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979). 
The timing of the Tanner decision, rather than the controversial holding, precipi­
tated the accusations leveled against the California Supreme Court. On November 7, 
197B, on the day of the retention election, stories circulated that the court had de­
layed the Tanner decision to prevent adverse reaction against Chief Justice Bird and 
three other justices. These reports asserted that the decision had not been announced 
despite the fact "that individual decisions were signed some time ago by all members 
of the court." See generally Greenburg, judicial Misadventures in California: A Re­
sponse to Professor Tribe, 65 ABA J. 1493, 1494 (1979). 
4. Chief Justice Bird won retention by 51.7% of the vote, the narrowest margin 
for a judge in the state's history. See Tribe, Trying California's judges on Television: 
Open Government or judicial Intimidation?, 65 ABA J. 1175, 1176 (1979). 
5. See Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1494. 
6. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1177. See also Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 
474,499,601 P.2d 1030, 104B, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494,512 (1979) (en bane), in which a spe­
cial California Supreme Court held that new rule 902.5 of the California Rules of 
Court, authorizing a public investigation by the Commission, was unconstitutional in 
light of CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § IB, sub. (f). 
7. CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § 1B, sub. (f) states: "The Judicial Council shall make 
rules implementing this section and providing for confidentiality of proceedings." In 
Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (en 
bane), the court concluded that a strong policy in favor of confidentiality and the ab­
sence of intent to change the former constitutional requirement of confidentiality, 
CAL. CaNST., art. VI, § lOb, ~ 3, precluded the Judicial Council from authorizing 
public investigations before the Commission. Id. at 499, 601 P.2d at 104B, 159 
Cal. Rptr. at 512. 
B. California Judicial Conduct Commission Resolution to amend the rules of evi­
dence, adopted April 20, 1979, and introduced in the proceedings as Exhibit 660. 
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into intent, motivation, and speculation, and it welcomed the 
rankest type of hearsay as well as multiple hearsay evidence. 9 
In addition, the investigation broadened to irrelevant dis­
cussions of internal matters. Justices were called upon to discuss 
why their secretaries did not receive carpeting and why one justice 
would not speak to another justice unless a law clerk was present to 
take notes. Staff members were asked about conversations with 
newspaper reporters. Law clerks were grilled on why a particular 
footnote was inserted into an opinion. Justices were cross-examined 
as to why specific citations were included in their writings. Finally, 
every draft of an opinion, every intra-office memorandum, and all 
court records of an internal nature relating to a number of 
specific cases were subpoenaed and offered in evidence in public 
proceedings. 
I had warned the Commission and its counsel several times 
that they were violating our state constitutional requirement of 
confidentiality,10 but they chose to continue their investigation in 
public. I found the investigation so bizarre that my conscience dic­
tated I compel compliance with the state constitution by means of 
a lawsuit. ll My colleagues, though agreeing generally with my po­
sition, did not see fit to take similar action. Through a convoluted 
series of court proceedings12 I was able to obtain the unanimous 
judgment of eleven appellate court justices that indeed the state 
constitution meant precisely what it said. 13 Therefore, the Judicial 
Council did not have the power to authorize public investigations 
9. For example, a law clerk witness was asked the following questions: "What 
did Justice A tell you that Justice B said to him during or after the court conference in 
which the case was discussed?" "What was the law clerk's demeanor when you asked 
him ifhis judge's opinion was politically motivated?" Questions by Commission mem­
bers such as these were not uncommon. 
10. In mid-June of 1978, I informed the Commission counsel that, if required to 
testify in public, I would challenge the constitutionality of the public hearing by filing 
a petition in the superior court. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 500-01, 
601 P.2d 1030, 1048, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 512 (1979) (en bane). 
11. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 
(1979) (en bane). 
12. The Courts of Appeal for the Second Appellate District granted my peti­
tion for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its denial and to 
quash the Commission's subpoena directed at me. Before the' court's decision be­
came final, the Commission petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief. All 
the supreme court justices, except Associate Justice Newman, disqualified them­
selves from the case. Therefore, the Chief Justice assigned six courts of appeal jus­
tices, selected by lot, to act on the petition. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 
474,480,601 P.2d 1030, 1034, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1979) (en bane). 
13. See note 7 supra. 
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before the Commission on Judicial Performance, and I was not 
constitutionally required to testify at a public hearing before the 
Commission. 14 Commission hearings that had taken nearly five lei­
surely weeks in front of television cameras were thereupon con­
cluded hastily in. three days in private. The sport, the exhilaration 
of the hunt, the play-acting on center stage had been terminated. 
The Commission ultimately issued a terse report declaring that 
there was no basis to proceed against any supreme court justice. 15 
The hearings conducted by the Commission cost the taxpayers 
more than a half million dollars, including $400,000 for the private 
counsel it hired. 16 I cannot question the expenditure of taxpayers' 
dollars for a reasonable investigation based on sound procedures. 
In this case, however, the Commission wasted both time and 
money by failing to exercise restraint before conducting proceed­
ings. I would like to stress that the Commission's counsel took 
statements from every justice, and from countless law clerks and 
other persons, before undertaking its proceedings. Instead of evalu­
ating this evidence to determine whether there was some reason­
able basis to proceed, the Commission deemed itself compelled to 
plow the same investigative ground in public. The information the 
Commission members had before they donned their makeup for 
television performances was that there was no basis for charges 
against any member of the court. A half million dollars and a half 
year later they reached the same conclusion. What began with a 
loud media bang ended with an anticlimactic whimper. 
There were both winners and losers in this profligate venture. 
The Commission members won. They received personal recogni­
tion and adulation from professional court detractors. Some mem­
bers of the Commission counsel staff won. One assistant is now 
running for Congress on the strength of the attention he received. 
Finally, the newspaper, television, and radio media won. They re­
ceived daily gossip stories with which to titillate their readers and 
listeners. The Supreme Court of California, despite the Commis­
sian's findings, was the big loser. A prestigious tribunal was now to 
be judged by the public on the basis of personality rather than ju­
14. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 499, 601 P.2d 1030, 1048, 159 
Cal. Rptr. 494, 512 (1979) (en bane). 
15. CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION, REpORT OF COMMISSION ON 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (Nov. 5, 1979). 
16. I also employed private counsel for my litigation against the Commission, but 
my lawyers and their prestigious law firm contributed their extensive and successful 
legal work as pro bono service. 
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dicial product. And the public lost. When respect for the only 
peaceable dispute-resolving agency, the court system, is destroyed, 
our democratic processes as a whole are in jeopardy. 17 
The experience in California demonstrates clearly that once 
administrative agencies or any nonjudicial bodies are permitted to 
inquire into internal functions of the judiciary, absent articulable 
charges of corruption, the independence of the judiciary and its 
ability to function efficiently are gravely threatened. There is no 
more pathetic sight than learned judges cringing in fear of an ag­
gressive investigative commission the members of which are pan­
dering to the media. 
California has often been an innovator in judicial reform and 
administration over the years. 18 The recent inquiry was also inno­
vative, but it should be a warning to the bench and bar throughout 
the country. Judges cannot invite nonjudicial agencies to investi­
gate the courts and still retain the freedom of conscience, inde­
pendence, and courage implicit in the decisionmaking process. 
Some commentators postulate that judicial independence is an out­
moded concept. Professor Raoul Berger, for example, suggests that 
it has become a fetish. 19 Others counter with the word "account­
ability."20 In my opinion, there is ample accountability to the pub­
lic for state judges who are corrupt, intemperate, or senile in the 
form of rejection by the electorate. If no election is impending, 
there are other responsible methods of proceeding, such as im­
peachment, proper inquiries by duly constituted commissions,21 
and ~ecommendations to the state's highest court for discipline. 
The sanctions may take various forms including private censure, 
public censure, suspension, or removal. 
Public hearings into internal court matters, however, create 
the potential for incalculable mischief. For example, a trial judge 
17. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1179. See generally Kaufman, Chilling Judicial 
Independence, 88 YALE L. J. 681 (1979). Contra, Berger, "Chilling Judicial Inde­
pendence": A Scarecrow, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1979); See also Berger, Impeach­
ment ofJudges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L. J. 1475 (1970). 
18. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1176. 
19. Berger, supra note 17, at 850. Professor Berger argues that "It is precisely 
this unremitting and unauthorized expansion of judicial governance that counsels us 
to reject the claim to 'absolute' independence. For uncircumscribed power is alien to 
our democratic system." Id. 
20. See, e.g., Berkson & Tesitor, Holding Federal Judges Accountable, 61 JUDI­
CATURE 442 (1978); Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1496. 
21. See note 26 infra. 
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who grants probation to a convicted defendant, upon what the 
judge believes are adequate grounds, may find himself the victim 
of an attack by media commentators. If this results in the judge's be­
ing subject to a public inquiry into his beliefs, thought processes, 
discussions with staff, and conduct in similar cases, he may be 
induced in other cases to temper his judgment in the interest of 
avoiding public humiliation. The threat of people saying "he's soft 
on crime" could affect not only the timid or sensitive judge, but 
even a normally forthright judge. 
Judicial independence suffers from that Damoclean sword. 
This is particularly so today when media commentators wield such 
extraordinary power. One who is irresponsible can, by a single 
thoughtless insinuation, reach millions of persons and instantly de­
stroy, in the name of accountability, the career of a jurist who has 
devoted his lifetime to the law. 
A logical question would be whether there has been any indi­
cation of an effect of the investigation upon judicial independence. 
I cannot breach the confidences of our court conferences, nor can I 
probe into the subjective fears of my colleagues. But in the scant 
few months since the Commission proceedings began, there have 
been some objective manifestations of judicial timidity. Fewer sig­
nificant petitions for hearing have been granted, a drop of approxi­
mately thirty percent from 1978 to 1979. 22 And some justices are 
now more likely to disqualifY themselves from sensitive cases on 
the most flimsy of purported ethical bases, rather than to face 
forthrightly the decisionmaking responsibility. 23 
In view of the post-Watergate syndrome, it is logical to ques­
tion whether all hearings should be open or whether secrecy is per 
se suspicious. State lawmakers, by their actions, have appeared to 
give a negative answer. Washington has become the fiftieth state to 
create a judicial conduct commission. 24 Nevertheless, each state 
22. The supreme court granted 273 petitions during the 1977-78 term. JUDI­
CIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1979 JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
REPORT. Only 193 petitions were granted during the 1978-79 term. JUDICIAL COUN­
CIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1980 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT. 
23. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct's liberal standard for disqualification per­
mits a judge to decline cases when "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
. . . " ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 3(A) (1) (1976) (emphasis added). 
24. the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico also have judicial conduct com­
missions. Most jurisdictions provide for confidentiality, at least until formal charges 
are preferred against a judge. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 51-51k, 511 (West 
Cum. Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211c §§ 1,2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
See generally Conduct Commissions: The Process of Preserving Confidence in the Ju­
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provides for the confidentiality of proceedings, at least until formal 
charges are preferred against a judge. 
The rationale for this respect for confidentiality was articulated 
by the ad hoc court25 which heard my lawsuit in Mosk v. Superior 
Court. 26 The court declared: 
The confidentiality of investigations and hearings by the Com­
mission is based on sound public policy. Confidentiality encour­
ages the filing of complaints and the willing participation of 
citizens and witnesses by providing protection against possible 
retaliation or recrimination . . . . Confidentiality protects judges 
from injury which might result from publication of unexamined 
and unwarranted complaints by disgruntled litigants or their at­
torneys ... , or by political adversaries. Confidentiality of inves­
tigations by the Commission preserves confidence in the judici­
ary as an institution by avoiding premature announcement of 
groundless claims of judicial misconduct or disability. . . . 
Confidentiality of proceedings before the Commission is essential 
to protecting the judge's constitutional right to a private admo­
nishment . . . , if the circumstances so warrant. When removal 
or retirement is justified by the charges, judges are more likely 
to resign or retire voluntarily without the necessity of a formal 
proceeding if the publicity that would· accompany such a pro­
ceeding can thereby be avoided. 27 
The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclu­
sions. 28 
diciary, 63 JUDICATURE 204-50 (1979); Note, State Judiciary Disciplinary Commis­
sions and Proceedings: Developing Administrative and Legal Standards for 
Evaluating Judicial Misconduct, 10 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 685 (1979); Comment, The 
Procedures ofJudicial DiSCipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190 (1976). For extensive analysis 
of judicial conduct commissions in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and California, see 
Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal With It, 35 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROS. 151 (1970). 
25. See note 12 supra. 
26. 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (en bane). 
27. ld. at 491, 601 P.2d at 1041-42, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06 (citations omitted). 
28. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 898 (1978). Un­
ease in this area is not limited to state courts. The federal Judicial Conduct and Dis­
ability Act of 1979, S. 1873 [added to S. 1477], 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONGo REC. 
S15,435 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979), has passed the Senate and is now awaiting House ap­
proval. The merit of the proposal is that it places responsibility for resolution of inter­
nal judicial problems with the 11 judicial councils. Sanctions short of dismissal are 
authorized, with impeachment the only vehicle for removal. The Act also urges "in­
formal, collegial resolution" of disability and disciplinary matters. For a favorable in­
depth analysis of the proposed legislation, see Kaufman, supra note 17. Contra 
Berger, supra note 17. 
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I mentioned at the outset that California courts are likely to 
return to page one. The reason is that organized conservative court 
probers tasted blood last year, and they are poised for the kill this 
time out. This is not outrageous hyperbole. A group known as the 
Law and Order Campaign Committee,29 financed largely by gun 
lobby money, is organized in metropolitan areas for the purpose of 
rating judges on their performances. Included are such inquiries as 
how judges stand on the death penalty or how many defendants 
they sentence to prison. The Committee will support campaign op­
ponents for those judges whose replies to these and similar ques­
tions are not deemed satisfactory. In addition, the group is spon­
soring legislation to compel an indexing of judges' criminal sen­
tencing. Thus, they advocate a box score on at-bats, hits, and er­
rors, as if the fate of human beings can be equated with a pitcher's 
curves and sliders. Qualities of a good judge such as impartiality, 
intelligence, independence, and integrity to do what the law re­
quires regardless of personal consequences are to be disregarded. 
The new standard by which judges are to be measured is how of­
ten they reach certain results rather than how objectively they dis­
pense justice based on individual facts. 
On a state-wide basis, the Law and Order Committee is circu­
lating an initiative measure to abolish our long-standing Missouri 
plan30 of retaining or rejecting appellate court justices on a yes-no 
vote, a program which has been widely accepted as enhancing the 
quality and independence of the higher courts,31 and to substitute 
therefor the typical anachronistic political method of having candi­
date opposition for every justice on shortened terms. The executive 
director of the so-called Law and Order group has explained its po­
sition with a rare economy of words: "All we are asking for is a re­
sponsible and accountable judiciary." Translated from the general 
to the specific, this means that conservatives want judges who 
agree with them. 
Referring to the state supreme court justices, the group's di­
29. The Law and Order Campaign Committee produced two dramatic and possi­
bly unfair television commercials on rape and busing issues designed to discredit 
Chief Justice Bird. Most stations, however, refused to air these commercials. See 
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1978, at 53. 
30. CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § 26. See Smith, The California Method of Selecting 
Judges, 3 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1951). 
31. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 
(1969). Contra, Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial 
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1978). 
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rector said, "They have become isolated in their power. They are 
accountable to virtually no one for their acts. They can make deci­
sions in secrecy and enforce them." This view raises some interest­
ing and disturbing questions. To whom should the justices be ac­
countable? To the media? To the governor? To the Law and Order 
Committee? Should their deliberations, unlike those of a jury, not 
be secret? Should their decisions not be enforced? Should the jus­
tices be put in a position in which they are forced to keep an eye 
on the popular opinion of the moment? Are we ready for Soviet­
like people's tribunals? 
I hope the answer to that last query is in the negative, that we 
do not want judges or justices, at any level of the judiciary, de­
pendent upon political fortunes and therefore prisoners of the pub­
lic whim. 32 It is tantalizing rhetoric when simplistic commentators 
insist that judges, like legislators and executives, should be respon­
sive to the public will. I suggest to you that their roles are not 
comparable. While legislators and executives are chosen to repre­
sent and further the public consensus, judges must have the forti­
tude to stand against public opinion when necessary to achieve 
justice under the Constitution. 33 
In the Federalist Papers,34 Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison expressed their belief that the judiciary, unlike the execu­
tive and the legislative branches, should be above the fray, imper­
vious to the shifting political winds. There have been attempts to 
disregard these words. Franklin Roosevelt railed against the con­
servative "Nine Old Men" and proposed to pack the Supreme 
Court. He failed. The John Birch Society railed against the liberal 
32. Professor Tribe explains: 

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the pending inquiry, far from be­

ing a reasoned response to real evidence of abuse, would never have been in­

itiated if the anticipated ruling in Tanner had been a popular one-if the 

court had been suspected of procedural misconduct but not of nullifying a 

widely approved law-and-order measure. The ongoing investigation is thus 

punishment for an unpopular result-Gallup Poll justice at its worst. 

Tribe, supra note 4, at 1178. 
33. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951), provides additional support. He states: 
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good re­
flex of a democratic society.... Their essential quality is detachment, 
founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judi­
ciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day 
and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, 
economic, and social pressures. 
[d. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
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Warren Court and called for impeachment of Earl Warren. It 
failed. I wish I could be certain that the current efforts to demean 
the judiciary also would fail. There was an old saying that the gods 
take care of children, drunkS', and the supreme court. I regret that 
in this age of cynicism about all government I am no longer confi­
dent of that protection, nor am I sanguine about the future. 
